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INTRODUCTION

The issue addressed in this Article is whether California's
Proposition 209, which prohibits race- and gender-based affirmative
action, passes constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause
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of The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 1
When voters in California passed Proposition 209 on November 5,
1996, it was enacted into law as part of California's Constitution.
This amendment provides that in public employment, education, or
contracting, the state will not practice discrimination or give preferential treatment to a person or group because of race, sex, color or
national origin.3
Governmental laws or policies authorizing race- or gender-based
preferences in the public sector are as hotly debated today as they have
been for the last twenty-three years. In DeFunisv. Odegaard, DeFunis
alleged before the United States Supreme Court in its first reverse race
discrimination suit that he was not admitted to a state law school
because he was white.4 DeFunis argued that he was a victim of racial
discrimination because he was not eligible for the racial preference in
admissions awarded to Blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, and
Filipinos.' By the time the DeFunis case was argued before the
Supreme Court the issue of reverse race discrimination was moot
because DeFunis was about to graduate from law school and a decision
by the Supreme Court would not have affected the outcome. 6
Although the DeFunis decision introduced the Supreme Court to
the emotionally charged issue of reverse race discrimination against
white males, the Supreme Court's constitutional rationale for an
affirmative action mechanism in the political process dates back almost
six decades to its dictum in United States v. Carolene Products Co.7
The Carolene Products case suggested that discrete and insular
minorities who suffer prejudicial discrimination, and who have not
been historically protected in the political process are entitled to some
sort of special protection from the federal judicial branch.' Providing
special protection or privileges for minorities and women to promote
fairness in the political process has become the battle cry for many who
support affirmative action policies based on gender or race in the
public sector.

1.
laws."
2.
3.

"No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).

Id.
4. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
5. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 317.
7.
8.

304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
See id.
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Professor Rosenfeld, for example, argues that only in an ideal
world should racial or gender differences be irrelevant in considering
Professor
opportunities in public education and employment.'
Rosenfeld further argues that equality of opportunity cannot be
satisfied with race- and gender-neutral policies once a state has
practiced official racial segregation or gender discrimination."' Thus,
he supports raced-based affirmative action on the theory that affirmative action is a preference to compensate for other unjustified preferences aimed at restoring fair competition while advancing equality for
minority groups."
Using race-based affirmative action programs to compensate
minorities for unjustified societal racial discrimination exemplifies an
expansive view of equality. But the Supreme Court has stated that
societal discrimination does not, by itself, provide adequate justification
for a race-based affirmative action plan.'2 Professor Rosenfeld is
correct in his conclusion that rejecting societal-based race discrimination as a permissible remedy under equal protection is to adopt a
position of marginal equality. 3 In an affirmative action plan based
on gender, the Supreme Court has approved gender preferences for
women for the14 sole purpose of overcoming the effects of societal
discrimination.
It is important to understand that under race-based affirmative
action programs, the Supreme Court has marginalized equality in favor
of expanding the concept of antidiscrimination. The great irony of
Proposition 209's attack on affirmative action is that the Proposition
forces us to realize that antidiscrimination and pro-affirmative action
are headed on a constitutional collision course. California's antiaffirmative action laws present this single question: may race- and
gender-based discriminatory preferences be denied to minorities or
women without violating antidiscrimination or equal protection laws?
Both the Equal Protection Clause and certain civil rights acts grant to
all people the equal protection of the law."

9. See MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 163-165 (1991).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
13. See ROSENFELD, supra note 9, at 179.
14. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia & White, JJ., dissenting) (decided under Title VII rather than the Equal Protection Clause).
15. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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There are few compelling reasons to support race-based classifications, whether the classification is old-fashioned discrimination based
on prejudice or new age discrimination based on preference. Laws
prohibiting affirmative action programs based on race are constitutional
unless the government shows that it is remedying past discrimination
which justifies the race-based preference.16 Similarly, laws prohibiting
gender-based affirmative action programs for women should be
considered constitutional where a gender-based preference is not
substantially related to an important governmental interest. One such
important governmental interest is remedying female under-representation in an area where women have been excluded because of a policy
of sexual stereotypes. 7
This Article will analyze the Equal Protection Clause in relation
to the government's ability to classify and will discuss whether race is
a prohibited classification. The author will closely critique the case of
Coalition For Economic Equity v. Wilson, 8 which challenges the
constitutionality of Proposition 209 because of its political burdens on
interests important to racial minorities and women. The author will
argue that Proposition 209's Equal Protection standard should be illicit
state action rather than political burdens. Finally, the author will
critique the Wilson court's understanding of violations of the Equal
Protection Clause. This understanding is rejected here because the
mere repeal of existing legislation is permissible even if that repeal
impacts racial minorities or women.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CLASSIFY

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to place on the states an affirmative duty to protect all
persons equally in the exercise of their natural and inalienable rights to
life, liberty, and property.19 The Equal Protection Clause, once

Consider the following examples: (1) It is illegal under Title VI to discriminate on the basis
of race in any activity receiving federal money. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); (2) Title VII prohibits
both race and sex discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); and (3) It is illegal
under Title IX to discriminate on the basis of sex in any activity receiving federal money. Title
IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1990).
16. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
17. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that the
state of Mississippi could not exclude a male from a state nursing school for females in the name
of affirmative action).
18. 946 F. Supp. 1480 (1996).
19. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
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described as the argument of last resort in one's constitutional
arsenal,20 is now a powerful first strike tool used by those who believe
they are victims of unlawful discrimination. America made its first
official statement in support of equality in 1776 in the Declaration of
Independence, declaring it to be a self-evident truth that all people are
created equal. 2' The incorporation of the concept of equality into the
Fourteenth Amendment was the result of the effort of organized
abolitionists.22
The Equal Protection Clause demonstrates a general requirement
of equality for all persons without exception.23 However, the demand
for equal protection does not mean that laws apply universally to all
persons.2 4 Instead, the government must be able to classify special
groups or classes of persons for benefits or burdens if it is to function
at all. 25 The battle for the special benefits of race-based affirmative
action demonstrates why the Equal Protection Clause must be properly
understood as a general requirement of equality for all persons without
exception. Race is simply not an appropriate basis for classification,
and neither burdens nor benefits should be based on a person's race.
However, this notion of equality conflicts with the government's basic
right to classify. The Supreme Court recognized this conflict when it
stated, "Indeed, the very idea of classification is that of inequality
"26

Here, then, is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a
"pledge of the protection of equal laws." But laws may classify.
And "the very idea of classification is that of inequality." In
tackling this paradox the Court has neither abandoned the demand
for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken
a middle course. It has resolved the contradictory demands of
legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine
of reasonable classification.27

20. See id.
21. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). See also U.S. CONST.
art. IV § 2, cl. 3 ("No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered upon Claim of the Part to whom such Service
or Labour may be due.")
22. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 341.
23. See id. at 343.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Atchison v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
27. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 344.
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In the affirmative action debate, however, one may ask whether it
is ever "reasonable" for the government to classify persons on the basis
of race if there is truly only one race-the human race. Given that
there is only one human race, the question arises whether an important
governmental interest exists to justify race-based classifications that
treat persons as not similarly situated for equal protection purposes
because of the color of their skin or the size of their noses. Race-based
affirmative action laws treat members of the human race as though
they were different and not similarly situated. This disparate
treatment results in social, political, and legal decisions based on
something other than race. The Equal Protection Clause requires that
persons similarly situated be treated similarly as a process of promoting
equality.2" Nevertheless, it is fair to ask what the words "similarly
situated" mean.29 Similarly situated is defined not by the nature of
the classification but the reasonable nexus of the classification scheme
to the purpose of the law.30 The reasonable classification includes all
persons who are similarly situated under the purpose of the law, which
may be to avoid some public harm or to promote a public benefit.3 1
Given America's history with race-based classification schemes,
it is not reasonable to believe that America can justify a race-based
benefit or burden that does not violate the natural equality of all
human beings. There was a natural law of equality before the
legislature began to place artificial labels on groups of people to further
governmental notions of racial superiority and official racial suppression of that class of people deemed to be of an inferior race.
Race-based classifications should always raise fundamental
questions about the motive behind the legislation and the state's role
in legislating race relations. Under the "pressure group" theory of
legislation, a race-based classification that either benefits or burdens a
particular group is the direct result of political pressure asserted by the
group with the largest political clout. Under this theory, the group
with the strongest legislative muscle will secure legislation of an
unequal character.32 Yet, the demand for equal protection becomes
meaningless under the pressure theory of legislative classifications

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See
See

Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 345.
id. at 346.
id.
id. at 350.

§ 1.
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, because this theory is incompatible with equal protection requirements.33
Legislative submission to powerful political pressures has been the
source of all race-based classification schemes, whether they are
affirmative action programs designed to benefit blacks or Jim Crow
laws which burdened blacks with racial discrimination. Such political
pressure does not constitute a legitimate purpose to justify race-based
classifications. Our common humanity demands that factors such as
race and color be treated as irrelevant incidents of birth, not as a basis
for a legislative classification.34
In their now classic law review article on equal protection analysis,
Professors Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek wrote, "We now
suggest the possibility that there are some traits which can never be
made the basis of a constitutional classification."3 Race is one of
these traits that should not be the basis of a constitutional classification. Even if an alleged public good is the goal of the legislation, a
classification based on race should render it invalid.
Professors Tussman and tenBroek were right when they asserted
that the forbidden classification doctrine as applied to race-based
classifications "cannot be advanced as an established and matured
judicial doctrine, [but] it is nevertheless, worth consideration as an
emerging one. ' 36 Five years before the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,Professors Tussman and tenBroek offered
the forbidden classification doctrine as the basis for an all-out assault
on segregation laws.37 Under this doctrine, segregation laws based on
race are unconstitutional because race alone is constitutionally
irrelevant, and no "separate but equal" argument could save such a
law.3" Similarly, under the forbidden classification doctrine, affirmative action laws based on race should be found unconstitutional, and
no rationale such as a set-aside for equality should save such a law
because race-based classifications are harmful to the public's sense of
fundamental fairness. Even if race is arguably related to a plausible
legitimate public purpose, under the forbidden classification doctrine,
the use of race would always invalidate such a use.39 Hence, the
forbidden classification doctrine must be developed and applied to

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.
See id. at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355.
See id. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19. at 355.
See id.

288
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race-based affirmative action laws or policies to defeat any notion of a
racial preference for any benign or invidious purpose.
In addition to the forbidden classification doctrine, the suspect
classification doctrine has been used by the Supreme Court to decide
whether or not a particular law or policy is unconstitutional. Under
this doctrine, a presumption of unconstitutionality arises where a law
is motivated by race.4" Applying this doctrine in Korematsu v. United
States, the Court held that all laws which classify on the basis of race
are immediately suspect. 4 ' The problem with the suspect classification scheme, however, is that it does not prohibit all race-based laws.
It gives the government some discretion to play the race card when, for
example, political pressure so demands. Any group with significant
political clout will usually receive the perceived benefit of this race card
game.
Both the forbidden classification and the suspect classification
doctrines have a place in analysis of constitutional law. The forbidden
classification doctrine, unlike the suspect classification doctrine, would
deny the government as a matter of law any ability to classify persons
on the basis of race. The rationale behind this prohibition is that racebased classifications violate both the self-evident truth of human
equality as articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the
racially neutral language of the Equal Protection Clause.
Whereas the forbidden classification doctrine should apply
exclusively to race-based classifications, the suspect classification
doctrine would apply, for example, to gender classifications. Under the
suspect classification doctrine, any law classifying persons based on
This approach is
gender would be presumed unconstitutional.
appropriate because rarely is gender relevant to any government
purpose that could not be achieved without the classification.
Although men and women are equal, it can be argued that they
are different biologically and that the state, therefore, should be able
to claim special circumstances under strict scrutiny to justify classifying
persons on the basis of gender. For example, in a situation where a
person is placed in imminent danger of losing life or limb, the state
may be able to survive strict scrutiny and classify people on the basis
of gender. Such a classification, whether based on wise public policy
or just plain old common sense, is at work when we place men and
women in separate jail cells to accommodate their biological differences. Regardless of certain well-accepted gender classifications like in jail

40. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 356.
41. See 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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cells, as a general rule, gender-based classifications should be suspect
and generally rejected as not being relevant to any compelling
governmental interest such as overcoming sexual stereotypes.
The Equal Protection Clause has been used by courts to criticize
both legislative classifications and legislative purpose which are either
discriminatory or arbitrary.4 2 If in the process of judicial review, the
court concludes that no reason exists for California's ban on race-based
affirmative action other than hostility toward African Americans and
other racial minorities, then it will find the anti-affirmative action law
to be unconstitutional. The Court followed this approach in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, a case decided more than one hundred years ago in which
the Court struck down a law requiring commercial laundry work to be
done in brick buildings.4 3 Although this law was racially neutral, it
existed for the sole purpose of discriminating against Chinese
Americans." Under the Yick Wo equal protection analysis, a ban on
affirmative action that is racially neutral is likely to be viewed as
unconstitutional if the restriction was adopted with prejudice toward
a particular racial group. If, however, the Court concludes that as a
matter of public necessity a state has a compelling reason to outlaw
race-based affirmative action in some areas and not others, it may allow
a state to take a piecemeal approach in eliminating racial discrimination.
Understanding the scope and significance of the Equal Protection
Clause is difficult because we think of it as a major tool of judicial
review." We must remember that all branches of government are
obligated to honor their "pledge of the protection of equal laws."46
The Equal Protection Clause requires that a legislator guard herself
against favoritism or inequality of purpose, and that as she imposes
special burdens or confers special benefits, she must do so only to
promote the public good.47 The question for analysis then is whether
the motive for Proposition 209 is to promote the public good or to
express hostility toward women and racial minorities.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 345.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See id. at 373.
See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19, at 365.
Id.
See id.
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COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY V. WILSON48

In Wilson, the plaintiffs filed a request for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the state from enforcing Article 1, section 31 of the
California Constitution, also known as Proposition 209. This section
states in the relevant part, "[t]he state shall not discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting."49 In
Wilson, the federal district court stated that Proposition 209 reaffirms
existing antidiscrimination protections provided by the guarantee of
equal protection in both the United States and California Constitutions. o The equal protection of the laws aspect in Wilson, which
simply reaffirms existing law, was not at issue in the case because a law
that merely affirms constitutional principles of nondiscrimination is of
course constitutional. 51
The federal district court stated that the U.S. Constitution
precludes voluntary, government sponsored race and gender preferences
without meeting a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. The court
pointed out that prior to Proposition 209, governmental entities were
generally prohibited from using race based affirmative action classifications unless those classifications could pass the strict scrutiny test.
Under Equal Protection strict scrutiny analysis, only those programs
narrowly tailored to break down patterns of intentional racial exclusion
by the enacting agency are allowed.52
Congress and the courts had prohibited discrimination and limited
governmental use of race long before Proposition 209 was enacted.
However, all the parties concede that the people of California intended
to do something more than simply restate the existing law when they
adopted Proposition 209." 3

48.
49.
50.
1, § 7(a)
51.
52.
53.

946 F. Supp. 1480 (1996).
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).
See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1488. See also U.S. CONST. amend XIV; CAL CONST. art.
(providing for equal protection of the laws).
See id.
Id. at 1489 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989)).
See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1489.
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A.

The Right to Full Participationin the Political
Life of a Community

This section of the Article focuses on whether the effort to do
"something more" in Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The Wilson court decided to issue a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of Proposition 209 based on the rationales
articulated by the Supreme Court in three cases known as the Hunter
trilogy-Hunter v. Erickson,14 Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1 [hereinafter Seattle],5" and Crawford v. Board of Education of
Los Angeles.56 Using this trilogy, the federal district court issued the
preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs demonstrated a probability
of success on their claim that Proposition 209 violates the Equal
Protection guarantee of full participation in the political life of the
57

community.

The court in Wilson framed the Equal Protection issue narrowly.
It asked whether the specific method of curtailing race- and genderbased affirmative action chosen by Proposition 209 unlawfully violates
the rights of women and minorities to fully participate in the political
system.58 In short, the court in Wilson evaluated whether the
"something more" intended by Proposition 209 was to deny, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, minorities and women an
equal opportunity to participate in the full life of the political
community.59
The court's conclusion that Proposition 209 probably violates
Equal Protection under the Hunter trilogy enjoys some preliminary
scholarly support. At least two scholars, Vikram D. Amar and Evan
H. Caminker, believe that the Hunter trilogy requires a federal district
or federal appellate court to invalidate Proposition 209 on Equal
Protection grounds.6" Amar and Caminker argue that Proposition

54. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
55. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
56. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
57. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1491. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the argument that Proposition 209 violates the Supremacy
Clause because it is preempted by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. See id. Judge Henderson ruled the plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the claim that Proposition 209 is preempted by Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. See id.
58. See id. at 1490.
59. See id. at 1491.
60. See Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal PoliticalBurdens,
and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1020 (1996).
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209 treats race differently from any other category for purposes of
public employment, education, and contracting.6 1 Because Proposition 209 isolates affirmative action based on race, Amar and Caminker
argue that it appears to violate the Equal Protection Clause as
62
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Hunter trilogy.
However, Amar and Caminker's limited and relatively guarded
prediction that Proposition 209 is unconstitutional should not be given
too much weight. In their article, Amar and Caminker attempt to
dissect the Supreme Court's reasoning to understand and hopefully
predict how a state or lower federal court will measure Proposition 209
against the cases in the Hunter trilogy.6 3 Amar and Caminker, in
concluding that Proposition 209 is unconstitutional, do not focus on
how the Supreme Court would or should evaluate the Hunter cases, but
on how the lower court, faithfully adhering to the Hunter cases, should
find Proposition 209 unconstitutional.
Unlike Amar and Caminker, this author's goal is to demonstrate
that a lower court, faithfully following the Hunter trilogy, could
determine that Proposition 209 is constitutional under the rationale of
the last opinion in the trilogy, Crawford v. Board of Education.6 4 The
Supreme Court, for instance, could and probably will find that
Proposition 209's prohibition on race-based affirmative action does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it contains "neither an
illicit motive" nor a discriminatory intent on the part of the state of
California.
A state law is subject to strict scrutiny if it has either a race-based
classification or an illicit racial motive.6 5 Proposition 209 easily
avoids strict scrutiny on the race-based classification theory because it
is racially neutral on its face. Additionally, it does not have an illicit
racial motive. Its obvious motive is to prohibit the use of race-based
classifications in making governmental decisions about public
education, employment or contracts. Therefore, most courts are
certain to conclude that Proposition 209 survives the illicit racial
motive test. Indeed, Proposition 209 was enacted in spite of its impact
66
on racial minorities rather than because of its impact on them.

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.

64. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
65. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.

469 (1989); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
66. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Amar and
Caminker are correct in stating that it would be very hard to make an illicit or invidious racial
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Amar and Caminker are fundamentally wrong to suggest that the
Hunter doctrine is premised on a rationale other than the traditional
theory of illicit motive and race-based classification. The Hunter
trilogy does not depart from traditional Equal Protection analysis when
changes in the political process make it more difficult for racial
minorities to achieve legislative success. Instead, according to the
Hunter doctrine, these changes to the political process will be held
valid unless the Court finds they are based on an illicit racial motive.67
Despite their article's shortcomings, Amar and Caminker asked
the key question of whether, under the Hunter doctrine, motive is a
more appropriate inquiry than the racial character of the governmental
action. 68 Still, while this was the right question, Amar and Caminker
came to a highly suspect and vulnerable conclusion because they
advised lower courts not to characterize the Hunter trilogy as a motive
inquiry. 69 Hunter, Seattle, and Crawford may be understood as either
soft intent decisions or as decisions analyzing the spectrum of illicit
state action under an equal protection analysis.7"
When addressing facially race neutral governmental policies that
are nonetheless racial in nature, motive or intent has been the correct
intent behind Proposition 209. Amar & Caminker, supra note 60, at 1023. Voters in California
may endorse the antidiscrimination provision of Proposition 209 in spite of, rather than because
of, any antiminority racial message sent by the antipreference provision in the law. See id.
According to Amar and Caminker, there are several noninvidious reasons that could motivate
people to support the antipreference provision in Proposition 209.
Two readily apparent justifications are notions of fundamental fairness and concerns
about economic efficiency. As to fairness, some people sincerely believe that affirmative
action preferences for minorities are morally objectionable in precisely the same way as
is conventional discrimination against these groups. For them, using membership in a
group defined by immutable criteria to distribute either benefits or burdens is
presumptively unjust. And race and gender preference programs are the two most
common departures from the so called individual (as distinguished from group) equality
norm. From this perspective, the inclusion of some sex provisions in addition to the
race provisions... demonstrates the sincerity of the decision to reject programs based
on group equality theories. Id.
As to efficiency, some people believe that affirmative action preferences undermine economic
growth because the best people are not selected. See id.
Other supporters of Proposition 209 might believe that public consideration of race even
when benignly motivated is inherently stigmatic, divisive, and dangerous public policy. For some
of the reasons listed above Amar and Caminker conclude that a court would find it difficult to
find Proposition 209 unconstitutional under conventional equal protection doctrine requiring facial
discrimination or illicit motive. See id. at 1024.
67. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538.
68. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 60, at 1034.
69. See id. at 1035.
70. See id. Amar and Caminker concede that if Hunter and Seattle are best understood as
soft intent cases, then Proposition 209 may not be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. See id.
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inquiry under existing Supreme Court precedent ever since Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.7 Proposition 209 will ultimately survive constitutional
attack because there is no exception for political burden to the
discriminatory intent requirement when the law does not classify on its
face or otherwise contain illicit state action.
The Equal Protection Clause is designed to keep states from
intentionally discriminating against persons on the basis of race.7 2 Its
ultimate duty is to make race an irrelevant factor in governmental
decisions.7 3 Not only does Proposition 209 lack the discriminatory
intent required for an Equal Protection Clause violation, but it
advances the Fourteenth Amendment's goal of abolishing all race-based
discrimination imposed by the government.74 The federal district
court in Wilson failed to properly analyze its preliminary injunction
prohibiting the enforcement of Proposition 209 as an issue of discriminatory intent.73
Therefore, its decision that Proposition 209 is
probably unconstitutional will be reversed unless a subsequent court
concludes that Proposition 209 does not rationally relate to a legitimate
76
state interest.
B.

The Racial/GenderImpact of Proposition 209 on
the California Political Process

Before the passage of Proposition 209, anyone seeking to petition
his or her elected representatives to adopt, amend, or retain affirmative
action policies based on race or gender faced the same obstacles
encountered by any constituent seeking preferential treatment in the
field of contracting, employment, or education.77 These obstacles
include petitioning and lobbying the specific policy makers with the
authority to adopt such programs. The programs typically can be
approved by a simple majority vote or by executive decision. In San
71.

118 U.S. 356 (1886).

72.

See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239

(1976).
73. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
74. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 939-40 (1996). For a criticism of Hopwood's
rationale and a rejection of the color blind approach to equal protection analysis, see Neil
Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil Rights
Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1144 (1996). Professor Gotanda believes that since
Hopwood leaves no place in education for recognition of racial diversity it is not a valid decision.
See id.
75. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
76. This author believes the Wilson analysis to be fatally flawed because it equates the more
burdensome racial impact of Proposition 209 on the political process to be an alternative to the
discriminatory intent requirement for establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
77. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp at 1498-99.
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Francisco, for example, people were able to convince the city to adopt
an affirmative action plan to remedy discrimination in that city's
contracting practices.78 In some cases, a local initiative process is
required before a city or other government entity can adopt an
affirmative action program.79
Since the passage of Proposition 209, women and racial minorities
petitioning their government for policies based on race or gender face
a more difficult burden. Indeed, they must first amend California's
Constitution to either repeal Proposition 209 or to allow the specific
governmental entity to adopt a race- or gender-based affirmative action
program.80
In California, there are two methods of amending the state
constitution-a constitutional initiative or a legislative constitutional
amendment. Both of these methods are burdensome. Under the first
process, sponsors must first obtain signatures in support of the
constitutional initiative. The number of signatures required is equal
to eight percent of the previous gubernatorial vote. In 1996, this
process required the collection of 693,230 valid signatures." Often,
the cost of getting an initiative qualified is between $500,000 and $1.5
million, and a qualified initiative must also be approved by a majority
of the voters.8 2 Under the second amendment process, the legislative
constitutional amendment, sponsors must get a two-thirds vote of
approval by both the California Senate and Assembly. Again, a
majority of the voters must approve the amendment in the next
statewide election. As one can see, substantial funds are required to
organize a campaign for both initiative qualification and for securing
legislative approval, the campaign supporting Proposition 209 had
spent $3.1 million by October 1996.3
Because of the new political process created by Proposition 209,
the plaintiffs were effectively precluded from asking local and state
policy makers to maintain or expand affirmative action polices based
on race or gender. For example, one of the plaintiffs, the Coalition for
Economic Equity (Coalition), had proposed fifteen amendments to San
Francisco's affirmative action policy. The Coalition had also met with
the city while preparing for a vote on the proposed legislation by the
entire San Francisco Board of Supervisors. With the adoption of

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id. at 1488.
See id. at 1488-89.
See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1498.
See id. at 1498-99.
See id. at 1499.
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Proposition 209, however, the Coalition can no longer pursue its
affirmative action campaigns through the previously available political
84
channels.
C.

Wilson's Equal Protection Claim and the Preliminary
Injunction Standard

The preliminary injunction is designed to preserve the status quo
pending a trial on the merits.85 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit will
grant an injunction only after the moving party shows either (1) the
probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
injury, or (2) the existence of serious questions to be decided and the
fact that the balance of hardships sharply favors the plaintiffs.8 6 Since
the Wilson plaintiffs alleged constitutional injury under Proposition
209, the court must evaluate the merits of their constitutional claim
before addressing the imminence and irreparable nature of the alleged
harm. 7
In considering the likelihood of success on Plaintiffs' Equal
Protection claim, the court in Wilson asserted that both racial
minorities and women have the right to full participation in the
political life of the community."
The Equal Protection Clause
prevents the exclusion of women and minorities from the political
process through overt practices, as well as through subtle distortions
of the political process.8 9 In Seattle, for example, the Court said that
under Equal Protection analysis, the state may not disadvantage a
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation on its
behalf any more than the state could dilute a person's right to vote."
In Wilson, the plaintiffs argued that despite Proposition 209's facial
neutrality, the Proposition violates the Equal Protection Clause by
restructuring the political process to the disadvantage of people seeking
to enact legislation benefiting women and minorities.9 The Wilson

84. See id.
85. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197,
1200 (9th Cir. 1980).
86. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410
(1991).
87. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (citing Berry v. City of New York, 906 F. Supp.
163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that when a party alleges a constitutional injury, "the two
prongs of the threshold showing required for injunctive relief merge into one"), rev'd on other
grounds, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996)).
88. See Wilson, at 1499.
89. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982).
90. See id. at 476.
91. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1499.
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plaintiffs argued that unlike individuals seeking race and gender
preferences, persons seeking preferences for age, disability or veteran
status continue to enjoy access to the political process at all levels of
government. They asserted that Proposition 209 violates Equal
Protection by removing the authority to redress racial and gender
problems to a new and remote level of government, "thereby, singling
out the interests of minorities and women for a special political
92
burden.
For Equal Protection analysis purposes, the Wilson court simply
asked the wrong question. The court asked whether Proposition 209's
prohibition of constitutionally-permissible government affirmative
action based on race and gender violated plaintiffs right to equal
protection. Yet, a more accurate reading of the issue presented in
Wilson is whether Proposition 209, without an illicit motive or lack of
rational basis, may prohibit race- and gender-based affirmative action
under a changed political process without violating the Equal Protection Clause. In answering its issue statement, the Wilson court relied
on what it called the Seattle-Hunter doctrine, citing two of the three
Supreme Court cases comprising the Hunter trilogy. These two cases,
Seattle93 and Hunter v. Erickson,94 are relevant to Proposition 209,
and although the Supreme Court could fairly use them to hold
Proposition 209 unconstitutional, it is more likely that the Court will
uphold Proposition 209 under the rationale of Crawford v. Board of
Education of Los Angeles.9"
Despite its contrary assertion, the Wilson court does not address
the defendant's contention that the issues examined by the court are
actually controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford.96
In Crawford, as in Wilson, California voters amended their constitution
9' Proposition I required the state courts
by adopting Proposition I.
to mirror the authority of the federal courts with respect to courtordered busing for the purpose of racial desegregation. On review, the
Supreme Court found that Proposition I merely repealed prior state
constitutional interpretations giving state courts more power to order
busing than federal courts had under the federal Constitution.9"

92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.

458
393
458
See

U.S. 457 (1982).
U.S. 385 (1969).
U.S. 527 (1982).
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1503-04.

97. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 531-32.
98. See id. at 535-36.
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Like Crawford, California voters in adopting Proposition 209
merely repealed state laws passed by state and local entities granting
race- or gender-based preferences which exceeded the minimum
protection required under federal law. Because there is no illicit
governmental motive behind the passage of Proposition 209, and
because voters were seemingly motivated by a desire to govern
impartially, Proposition 209 passes the rational basis test. It is valid
under the Equal Protection Clause despite its adverse racial and gender
impact throughout the political process.99 In Crawford, the Court
concluded that the repeal of busing as an option for state courts did
not distort the political process despite its adverse impact on desegregation. In Wilson, the court declared that "the present case is dramatically different from Crawford."'' ° Yet, Proposition 209, like the law
in Crawford, can be characterized as simply repealing all existing raceand gender-based affirmative action policies that exceed federally
mandated minimum requirements.''
Proposition 209 does not
reorder the political process on all affirmative action programs based
on gender and race in California. Instead, it only removes to a new
and remote level of government those programs which are not required
by either federal. statute or the U.S. Constitution. Proposition 209,
despite the fact that it singles out an issue of special concern to
minorities and women and in doing so alters the political process, does
not violate the Constitution unless the governmental action has an
illicit purpose or is too arbitrary to be rational.
IV.

PROPOSITION 209'S EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD
SHOULD BE ILLICIT STATE ACTION RATHER
THAN POLITICAL BURDENS

A close reading of Crawford strongly suggests that Proposition 209
will likely survive constitutional scrutiny under the Hunter trilogy.
Proposition 209 shares a common characteristic with Proposition I: a
lack of discriminatory purpose. 2 In Crawford, Proposition I amend-

99. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (holding that a law is unconstitutional if
it is motivated by invidious racial discrimination); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979) (holding that adverse impact on issues important to women is not enough, it is
only when one shows an invidious intent to discriminate because of gender that a law or policy
violates the Constitution). A showing of invidious motive under Proposition 209 would be
difficult to make according to scholars who think Proposition 209 may be invalid under the
Hunter trilogy. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 60, at 1023.
100. Wilson, 946 F. Supp at 1508.
101. See id.
102. See Crawford v. Board of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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299

ed the California Constitution by forbidding state courts from ordering
mandatory student'assignment or transportation. The only exception
to this ban on mandatory assignment or transportation was if a federal
a violation of Equal
court directed this action as a means to remedy
10 3
Amendment.
Fourteenth
the
Protection under
In Crawford, minority students attending the Los Angeles Unified
School District (District) filed a class action lawsuit in state court. The
central purpose of this lawsuit was to desegregate the District's schools.
Although filed in 1963, the Crawford suit did not go to trial until
1968. In 1970 a California trial court held that the District was
sufficiently segregated so as to violate both the California and United
States Constitutions. As a result of its conclusion, the trial court
required the District to prepare a desegregation plan."° The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, but on a
Unlike the trial court, the California
different legal theory.'
Supreme Court did not find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because of de jure segregation.10 6 Instead, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision by finding that only the California Equal
Protection Clause had been violated.'0 7 The court held that under
the state constitution, the District was obligated to take reasonable
action to remedy de jure and de facto segregation in public schools. 8
Thus, the court remanded the case to the lower court, instructing it to
develop a reasonable desegregation plan. 9
Following the remand from the state supreme court, the District's
mostly voluntary desegregation plan was rejected in favor of a second
plan that included substantial mandatory "busing" based on race and
ethnicity. The desegregation plan went into effect in the fall of 1978
without satisfying any of the litigants. In October 1979, while the
unsatisfactory desegregation plan was in effect, the trial court began
considering other options to reduce the problems of segregation."°
103. See id. at 529.
104. See id. at 529-30.
105. See Crawford v. Board of Educ. of Los Angeles, 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
106. See id. at 30.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 33.
109. See id. at 48. The California Supreme Court made the following comments to the trial
court while remanding the case: "While critics have sometimes attempted to obscure the issue,
court decisions time and again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but
is simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's obligation in this
field . . . . [I1n some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a
desegregation plan, while in other instances its costs, both in financial and educational terms will
render its use inadvisable." Crawford, 458 U.S. at 531 n.3 (citing Crawford, 551 P.2d at 47).
110. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 531.
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In November 1979, California voters approved Proposition I, thereby
amending the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the state
constitution. That amendment limited the scope of remedies available
under the state's constitution to those exercised by federal courts under
appropriate federal standards. In relevant part, Proposition I provided
as follows:
[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or
any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility
with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that
would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2)
unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional
law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to
remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause."'
After California voters passed Proposition I, the District asked the
state trial court to stop all mandatory reassignment and busing of
students. The state trial court denied this request. The basis for the
trial court's denial was the court's conclusion that Proposition I did not
apply to the Crawford case because of the court's prior finding of
unconstitutional de jure segregation by the District. As a result, the

111. See id. at 531 n.6. Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to Art. 1, § 7(a) of the
California Constitution. Following the adoption of Proposition I, section 7 now provides, in
relevant part:
(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or
elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public entity,
board or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution...
and (2) unless a federal court be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that
obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from
voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after the effective date
of this subdivision as amended. In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and
people of the state of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to
save public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited
financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education,
maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all
public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational
process, preserving harmony and tranquillity in this state and its public schools,
preventing the waste of scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment.
Id. at 531 n.6.
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trial court ordered a revised desegregation plan be implemented that
12
substantially relied on mandatory student reassignment and busing.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court." 3 The
appellate court concluded that the trial court's 1970 findings of fact did
not support the conclusion that the District violated the United States
The
Constitution through practicing intentional segregation." 4
California Court of Appeals held that Proposition I applied to the trial
court's desegregation plan, and the court therefore prohibited the
portion of the plan requiring mandatory reassignment and busing of
The court also held that
students for desegregation purposes.
Proposition I did not violate the United States Constitution.'
Furthermore, the court concluded that California did not have a duty
under state law to maintain a greater remedy for promoting desegregation than that required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 116
The California Court of Appeals held that Proposition I was
constitutional under both state and federal standards and therefore
vacated the orders entered by the state trial court. The California
Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal." 7 The United
States Supreme Court in Crawford agreed with the California Court of
Appeals, rejecting the holding that once a state chooses to do "more"
than is required by the Fourteenth Amendment, it can never recede." 8 The Supreme Court also rejected the trial court's narrow
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment calling it "destructive' of9
a State's democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. "
no support in the
The court found that such an interpretation had
21
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
of
decisions
By concluding in Wilson that Proposition 209 is probably
unconstitutional, the court improperly equated political burdens and
21
raced-based classifications with an illicit discriminatory purpose.'
Race-based classifications are permitted under current equal protection

112. See id. at 533.
113. Crawford v. Board of Educ. of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
114. See id. at 503-04.
115. See id. at 509.
116. See id. at 509-10. The California Court of Appeals did not accept the argument that
Proposition I denied minorities a right to desegregated education under due process. See id. at
510.
117. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 534.
118. See id. at 535.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1502.
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analysis if they are necessary to further a compelling state interest. 122
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that, "a racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification. ' 12 3 Proposition 209 does not contain a
racial classification, and therefore the court's analysis is misplaced.
The trial court in Wilson should have analyzed the unfair political
burden imposed by Proposition 209 on minorities and women under
the illicit motive or intent test or under the rational basis test. Instead,
the court mistakenly concluded that these political burdens violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Wilson court points out that Proposition 209 is similar to the
measures struck down in Hunter and Seattle in that none of the
initiatives classify persons based on race or gender.1 24 Instead, these
three initiatives were designed to turn back gains that were intended as
remedies for long-term discrimination suffered by minority groups.
Under all three measures, those seeking to reenact and preserve those
remedies could no longer use the same political mechanisms that had
been available prior to the passage of the enactments. 125 The measures in Seattle and Hunter dealt exclusively with the matter of race,
126
while Proposition 209 addresses the twin issues of race and gender.
A threshold matter to questions involving the Equal Protection
Clause is that the court must determine whether the legislation in
question contains a prohibited classification. 127 A reasonable inference can be made from Adarand that when a race- or gender-based
28
classification is not present, then intent analysis is not necessary.
If a court determines that there is no prohibited classification, it should
not then create what could be construed as the equivalent of a
prohibited classification in the absence of an illicit motive or the lack
of rational basis. In Wilson, the defendants properly asserted that
Proposition 209, unlike the initiatives in Hunter and Seattle, expressly
prohibits classifications based on race and gender, and it should not be

122. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536.
123. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
124. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1501.
125. See id.
126. See id. ("The differing levels of judicial scrutiny accorded race and gender
classifications, however, do not render the reasoning of Seattle and Hunter inappropriate in context
of gender. On the contrary, the doctrinal approach of those cases is wholly constant with the
heightened scrutiny applicable to gender classifications.") Id.
127. See Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995).
128. See id.
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read to create such classifications.' 29 However, the apparent facial
neutrality of the challenged measures in Hunter and Seattle did not
prevent the Supreme Court from going beyond the plain language of
the measures and asking whether, "'in reality, the burden imposed by
[the] arrangement necessarily falls on the minority.""' 3
In Wilson, the district court should have gone beyond the plain
language used in Hunter and Seattle and asked whether, in reality, the
burden imposed by Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The burden created by Proposition 209 arises because the
Proposition expresses illicit hostility to a recognized group based on
that group's race or gender. When a neutral law without a race- or
gender-based classification has a disproportionately adverse impact on
a minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if the law has
a discriminatory purpose.' 3' It is only when facially neutral classifications are passed because of an illicit motive to burden racial
minorities or women that the court must look beyond the law's plain
language. This illicit motive test can be used to indicate either a
discriminatory purpose or such a lack of rational basis for a legislative
policy that an arbitrary motive is necessarily inferred.
The Wilson court states that "defendants cannot use Proposition
209's facial neutrality as a shield against the Hunter analysis." '32
The court in Wilson apparently misunderstood the defendants'
argument. The defendants were not attempting to use the facial
neutrality of Proposition 209 as a shield to avoid scrutiny because the
legislation makes distinctions based on race or gender. 33 Instead,
they were merely asking the court to recognize "that a distinction may
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and
state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters."' 3 4 The defendants simply argued that Proposition 209 does
not contain an illicit motive or burden by the fact that it addresses--on
a race- and gender-neutral basis-affirmative action issues which may
have a disproportionate adverse impact on women and minorities.

129. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1502.
130. Id. (quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 468).

131. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537-38 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-48;
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
132. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1502.
133. See id.

134. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538.
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Proposition 209 Is not an Illicit Political Burden on Race- and
Gender-BasedAffirmative Action Governmental Programs
The most serious flaw in Wilson's analysis is the failure to treat
Proposition 209 as an affirmative action remedy based on race and
gender, but instead treating it as a case about access to the political
process.1 3 The defendants in Wilson asked the court to read Seattle
and Hunter "as cases about limits on state-sponsored remedies for past
'
It is not helpful for the Wilson court to conclude
discrimination." 136
that Seattle and Hunter are political access cases without addressing the
issue of illicit state action because of arbitrariness or discriminatory
motive. Burdens to the political process must contain either a
discriminatory purpose or illicit state action to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Proposition 209 is constitutional because it prevents
racial and gender discrimination by denying preferences not otherwise
allowed under the Equal Protection Clause.13 7 "[W]henever the
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race that
person has suffered an injury ... "138 Proposition 209 is valid
legislation because, as the defendants in Wilson asserted, it bars
legislation harmful to the rights of nonminorities.' 39
In Wilson, the defendants contended that Proposition 209 is
distinguishable from the illicit mandatory busing program barred in
Seattle and the legislation barred in Hunter because Proposition 209 is
designed to protect the rights of nonminorities against racial discrimination in the form of affirmative action. Unlike Hunter and Seattle,
Proposition 209 is not designed to deny political access, but to protect
nonminorities from exposure to the burdens of race- and gender-based
affirmative action programs. The defendants argued that Proposition
209 is constitutional because the only interference involved "zero-sum
A.

135. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1503.
136. Id.
(D]efendants' focus on the particular legislation barred by... Proposition 209, rather
than on the initiative ... [itself], suffers from a more fundamental flaw. Accepting
defendants' arguments would essentially require that this Court read Seattle and Hunter
as cases about the limits on state-sponsored remedies for past discrimination. This is
the inevitable conclusion that emerges from a primary focus on the legislation blocked,
rather than on the blocking initiative. As this Court has pointed out, however, the
instant case, as well as Seattle and Hunter, are more appropriately understood as cases
about access to the political process.
Id.
137. See Adarand, 116 S. Ct. at 2114.
138. Id.
139. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1502.
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antidiscrimination," which they defined as governmental policies that
help minorities at the expense of nonminorities. 4 ° Proposition 209
is constitutional because its purpose is to move this nation away from
zero-sum antidiscrimination policies to a zero-tolerance antidiscrimination plan.
The Wilson court's Seattle-Hunter attack on Proposition 209 is
unlikely to survive judicial review on the merits of the case. The
Wilson court's examination is likely to fail because Proposition 209's
only effect is to prohibit suspect governmental classifications that
'
"trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny."141
Because race-based
affirmative action programs are presumed to be unconstitutional under
Adarand's equal protection analysis, a state should be able to regulate
and prohibit those programs.142 Unlike racial classifications, gender
classifications are not inherently suspect.1 43 Instead, intermediate
scrutiny applies to gender classifications, requiring governmental
policies based on a gender classification to be subject to "an exceedingly persuasive justification. ' 14
Applying intermediate scrutiny to
Proposition 209, California has the burden of showing that any gender
classification "serves important governmental objectives 'and that the
means used are' substantially related to the achievement of those
Proposition 209 restricts governmental affirmative
objectives.' 14
action plans to those that are either race- and gender-neutral or that are
required by federal law because of an important governmental interest
for gender-based classifications or because of a compelling governmental interest for race-based classifications. The United States Supreme
Court's holding in Crawford supports the restrictive nature of
California's affirmative action remedies. 6 Proposition 209 does not
inhibit enforcement of any federal law or constitutional requirement for
race or gender-based affirmative action. 147 To the contrary, the real

140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220. In Wilson, one of the defendants' arguments focused
on the level of judicial review that attaches to the conduct prohibited by the challenged initiatives.
"According to defendants, the affirmative action efforts prohibited by Proposition 209 are, under
existing 14th Amendment principles, themselves constitutionally suspect and subject to heightened
scrutiny." Wilson 946 F. Supp. at 1502. The defendants argued that the "fair housing ordinance
and the busing programs that were overturned by the initiatives in Seattle and Hunter did not
themselves trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny." Id. at 1502-03 (citing Adarand, 515

U.S. at 220).
143. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220.
144. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
145. Id.
146. See Crawford v. Board of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
147. See id. at 535.
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focus of Proposition 209 is to embrace the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause with respect to gender- and race-based governmental
affirmative action policies. As the Court held in Crawford, "It would
be paradoxical to conclude that adopting the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the state actually violated
it.')48

In the Hunter trilogy, some believe the Supreme Court used a
two-pronged test.'49 Under the first prong, one must demonstrate
that the law under attack is raced-based because it "uses the racial
nature of an issue to define the governmental decision making structure
while imposing substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities."'5 0 Under the second prong, one must prove that the law
imposes an unfair political process burden on minority issues.
According to Amar and Caminker, strict scrutiny is triggered only if
the legislation satisfies both of these prongs. 5' A law imposing
special political process burdens on classes not defined by race does not
directly implicate the trilogy. Similarly, a law that deals explicitly with
"racial" issues, but does not impose any entrenching political process
is unproblematic under the analysis presented by Amar and
Caminker.' 52
Notwithstanding the views propounded by Professors Amar and
Caminker, strict scrutiny review is required under either of the prongs
identified in the Hunter trilogy. When the state makes a race-based
decision, strict scrutiny is implicated, and the governmental policy is
unconstitutional unless necessary to further a compelling governmental
interest. 3 Under the first prong, if the state "singles out for special
treatment issues that are associated with minority interests,"'5 4 then,
under traditional equal protection analysis, the Fourteenth Amendment
is violated because a subtle discriminatory purpose has been shown to
adversely impact minority interests.'
The very act of singling out issues based on their importance to
a racial group is suspect, and that conduct alone is sufficiently
suspicious to be presumed unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny. "[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
See Amar & Caminker, supra note 60, at 1026.
Id. (citing Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470).
See id.
See id.
See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536.
Amar & Caminker, supra note 60, at 1026.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976).
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is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification. '"156 Therefore, the real message from the
Hunter trilogy is that the Equal Protection Clause will be violated
when there is illicit governmental action. Moreover, this violation
exists whether the illicit government action is called a discriminatory
classification by implication for facially neutral legislative acts, or called
a subtle inference of discrimination when the legislation is merely an
attempt to disadvantage minority interests because of race or gender.
Under Hunter's second prong, any law imposing an unfair political
process burden on any group, regardless of race, should be subject to
strict scrutiny because equal access to the political process should be
treated like a fundamental interest, similar to the right to vote, for
equal protection purposes." 7 In Reynolds, for example, the Court
treated the right to vote as a fundamental interest because that right is
the essence of a democratic government.1 5 By analogy, equal access
to a fair political process is a fundamental interest because it is the life
blood of democracy, and therefore, it too should be subject to strict
scrutiny. If a facially neutral law creates a judicial presumption that
it was designed to create an unfair political arena for insular and
discrete minority interests, then that law should be subject to strict
scrutiny.'59 Footnote four of Carolene Products indicates that whenever ordinary political processes cannot be relied upon to protect
minority interests, a more searching judicial inquiry is needed. 60 In
Romer v. Evans, the Court stated that central to the idea of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that the
government be open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. 6 ' "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense.' 62 In Romer, the Court acknowledged, without disapproval, the Colorado Supreme Court's holding that the Colorado
Constitution infringed on the fundamental right of gays and lesbians
to participate in the political process. 63 Although not directly cited

156. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94).
157. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

158. See id. at 554-55.
159.

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

160. See id. at 153 n.4.
161.
162.
163.

116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).

Id.
See id. at 1624 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at
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in its reasoning in Romer, it is clear that the Hunter trilogy's message
of fair and impartial access to the political process is directly implicated. Under the rationale of Romer, when laws deny access to the
political process, they may be held unconstitutional even if they do not
involve a suspect class."'A Given the Court's rationale, Romer can
properly be understood as a radical and expansive view of the Hunter
trilogy's concerns about unfair political burdens on a class of people.
In Romer, the Court expanded the rationale of the Hunter trilogy while
revolutionizing its traditional equal protection analysis.
Scholars have stated:
[I]n Romer v. Evans, ...
the Supreme Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution as an unprecedented
per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . The Court
held that Amendment 2, which singled out a class of persons-homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals-and denied them the
right to seek protection from the government against public or
private discrimination based on that class membership, was 'a denial
of equal protection of the of the laws in the most literal sense'....
Because it also analyzed the Amendment under the rational basis
test, however, the Court's opinion is fraught with interpretive
difficulties. Although it leaves several unanswered.., questions in
the gay rights context, the case revolutionizes the Court's equal
protection analysis, raising new questions about the methodology
and substance of equal protection jurisprudence. 6
After Romer's unacknowledged expansion of the Hunter trilogy's
rationale-namely, the protection of class interests against hostility-Proposition 209's constitutionality may be analyzed under either
Romer or the Hunter trilogy by either the lower courts or by the United
States Supreme Court.
This Article's primary focus is on the pre-Romer and post-Hunter
trilogy Equal Protection implications of Proposition 209 under both
strict scrutiny and rational basis review. If Proposition 209 is about
promoting race-based affirmative action for minorities, then it must
survive strict scrutiny, and is therfore likely to be held unconstitutional
under traditional equal protection analysis.' 66 If, on the other hand,

164.

See id.

165. Leading Cases, 110 HAR. L. REV. 135, 155-156 (1996).
166. Some scholars think of the strict scrutiny standard as strict in theory and fatal in fact.
See Gerald Gunther, The Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). However

in a recent raced-based affirmative action case the following statement was made about the strict
in theory and fatal in fact school of thought. "We wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny
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Proposition 209 merely limits the remedies available to racial minorities
suffering societal discrimination to those remedies available under the
United States Constitution, without any illicit motive, then the
Proposition is entitled to a heavy presumption of constitutionality
under the Court's traditional rational basis review. 16 7 The message
of Crawford is that merely limiting the remedies available to achieve
racial diversity or desegregation does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.16 However, in Wilson, the court characterized Proposition
209 as a facially neutral constitutional amendment singling out
minorities for unique political burdens. Under this characterization,
Proposition 209 involves a suspect classification under equal protection
analysis. 169

B.

Proposition 209's Political Burdens are not Illicit in Character
Because Governmental Decisions Are Made in Spite
of Race and Gender

The federal district court in Wilson should have rejected the
plaintiffs' argument. They argued that despite facial neutrality,
Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it
restructures the political process to disadvantage only those seeking to
enact legislation benefiting minorities and women. 17' The plaintiffs
stated that prior to the passage of Proposition 209, those favoring
affirmative action policies based on race or gender were able to petition
state and local officials directly for support. Since Proposition 209 has
become law, supporters of race- and gender-based affirmative action
face the more daunting task of engaging in a statewide campaign to
amend the California Constitution. Supporters of preferences based on
a status other than race or gender (for example, age, disability, or
veteran status) continue to enjoy access to the political process at all
levels of government.
The plaintiffs contended that Proposition 209 denied them Equal
Protection by "removing the authority to redress only racial and gender
problems."7' They maintained that because race and gender problems can now only be redressed at a new and remote level of state

is strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
167. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1442-43

(2d ed. 1988).
168.
169.
170.

See Crawford, 458 U.S. 527.
See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1503-04.
See id. at 1499.

171. Id.
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government, Proposition 209 singles out the interests of minorities and
women for a special burden.1 2 Under traditional equal protection
analysis, preferences for age, disability, or veteran status are only
subject to a rational basis standard of judicial review. The age,
disability, or veteran preferences are not similarly situated in the
political process to race and gender because only race and gender,
among the identified preferences, are subject to a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny-strict scrutiny for race and intermediate scrutiny for
gender.'7 3 Any political burdens faced by minorities and women
because of Proposition 209 do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because those burdens are not special despite their perceived disproportionate impact on the interests of minorities and women. Thus, in
California, women and minorities face the same political obstacles as
nonminority males seeking preferences under the law. For example,
Proposition 209 would prohibit a county or city government from
passing an affirmative action program giving race-based preferences to
white males married to minority females in the name of promoting
racial diversity without first amending the state Constitution.
Although white males would be the direct beneficiaries of such a
policy, Proposition 209 would require amending the state constitution
to implement it because it is race-based. Such a policy is race-based
despite its special interests to white males and minority women who
might believe interracial marriages promote racial diversity and
affirmative action.
In Seattle, the Court stated that a "political majority may
generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the path
of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action."' 7 4
However, the Court went on to say that, "the State [may not] allocate
governmental power non-neutrally by explicitly using the racial nature
of a decision to determine the decision making process. '
The Wilson court relied on two Supreme Court decisions, Hunter
and Seattle, in concluding that Proposition 209 probably violates the
Equal Protection Clause.' 76 In Hunter, the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether citizens of Akron, Ohio, could repeal legislation

172. See id.
173. Strict scrutiny is required for race-based voluntary governmental preferences. See
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. Gender-based governmental policies are subjected to a heightened
intermediate level of scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
174. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470.
175. Id.
176. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1499-1500.
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enacted to prohibit racial discrimination in housing.'7 7 After the
Akron City Council passed a fair housing law, local citizens passed a
referendum to amend the city charter to require that fair housing
regulations be put to a citywide vote before such regulations could take
effect. As a result of the referendum, Section 137 of the city charter
applied not only to future fair housing policies, but it also suspended
the prior antidiscrimination housing law. 7 The Court believed that
Section 137 singled out city legislation of interest to racial minorities
for an unfair political burden. People seeking to enact housing
regulations in Akron on any basis other than race simply had to
persuade the city council to adopt the regulations. By contrast, those
seeking race-based regulations were required by Section 137 to confront
a city referendum. Indeed, for those citizens of Akron seeking
protection from racial bias in housing, "the approval of the city council
was not enough."'1 79 The Supreme Court correctly held that Akron's
restructuring of the political process violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
V.

A CRITIQUE OF THE WILSON COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION
VIOLATION THEORY

According to Wilson, the Supreme Court's analysis of Section 137
in Hunter was based on two particular features of the legislation.''
First, Section 137 raised an Equal Protection issue because it singled
out an issue of particular interest to racial minorities: race-based
housing discrimination. 2 In order to avoid violating the Equal
Protection Clause, Section 137 would have to impose a new political
burden on all legislation. 3 The second reason Section 137 deserved
heightened scrutiny was the fact that it imposed a novel political
burden on all future efforts to enact fair housing legislation. The
citizens of Akron could use the referendum process simply to repeal
the fair housing ordinance previously passed18 4 by the city council
without violating the Equal Protection Clause.
"Although neither of these two features of [Section] 137, standing
alone, would have offended the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
See id. at 387.
Id. at 390.
See id. at 393.
See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1500.
See id.
See id. (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393-95 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
See id.; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5. See also Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539.
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held that the confluence of the two factors-the targeting of a racial
issue and the reordering of the political process-constituted a racial
classification that required the most exacting judicial scrutiny." '
The Wilson court's treatment of Hunter is superficial considering
the much larger scope of the Equal Protection doctrine. The Hunter
decision itself is conducive to superficial analysis by lower courts
because it was result-oriented. In an effort to reach its desired result,
the United States Supreme Court unnecessarily equated race-neutral
legislation with race-based legislation. However, under this approach,
the Hunter Court reached the right result with the wrong rationale. In
Hunter, Section 137 violated the Equal Protection Clause because
restructuring the city's political process could only be rationally
explained as directing hostility toward a racial minority and not as a
mere repeal of existing legislation.' 86 Classifications that are facially
neutral, but that serve as an obvious pretext for racial discrimination,
are presumed unconstitutional and violate the Equal Protection Clause
unless they are justified by a compelling state interest.187 A proper
reading of Hunter suggests that Section 137 violated the Equal
Protection Clause because restructuring the political process to require
a referendum for a fair housing law was an obvious pretext for racial
discrimination.
Unlike Section 137, Proposition 209 is neither an obvious nor
subtle pretext for gender or racial discrimination. Proposition 209 has
the opposite effect of Section 137 because it prohibits rather than
encourages discrimination on the basis of race and gender. Unlike
Section 137, Proposition 209 can easily be explained on a basis other
than as race-based discrimination. One of the rational and laudable
goals of Proposition 209 is to encourage state government to designate
race as a forbidden classification and gender as a suspect one. Because
of these differences between Proposition 209 and Section 137,
Proposition 209 is likely not unconstitutional under the Wilson court's
reading of Hunter.
In Seattle, the Court applied the Hunter rationale to a statewide
initiative that prohibited the mandatory busing of students to achieve
racial integration in the schools."' 8 After a Seattle school district
made plans to implement a mandatory busing plan, voters in Washington adopted Initiative 350. Initiative 350 stated, in relevant part, that

185.
186.
187.
188.

See
See
See
See

Wilson 946 F. Supp. at 1500.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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"no school board. . . shall directly or indirectly require any student to
attend a school other than the school which is geographically nearest
or next nearest to the student's place of residence."'' 9 The Court
was not impressed with the facially neutral language of Initiative 350
and held that the measure was enacted because of, and not merely in
The
spite of, its adverse impact upon busing for integration.'
Wilson court correctly observed that both Hunter and Seattle violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because those
measures were enacted with the purpose of adversely impacting an
issue important to racial minorities.' 9 ' It is mere speculation to
conclude that Proposition 209 was enacted for this same purpose
because it is equally plausible to conclude that Proposition 209 was
passed in spite of its impact on race and gender issues. When the
Wilson court conceded that the measures in Hunter and Seattle violated
the Equal Protection Clause because they were enacted for the purpose
of adversely affecting racial minorities, it may have inadvertently
distinguished those cases from Proposition 209. Proposition 209,
unlike the Washington and Akron initiatives, cannot be read to create
hostile or adverse racial and gender classifications because it was
enacted in spite of its impact on race and gender. 92 Proposition 209
is like the facially neutral measure that impacted busing for school
integration in Crawford that did not use a racial classification.' 9 3
The defendants in Wilson were correct to ask the court to focus
on the nature of the legislation barred by Washington's Initiative 350,
Akron's Section 137, and California's Proposition 209. This request
simply asked the court to read Crawford as a case about the limits on
state-sponsored remedies for past societal discrimination in the absence
of a federal remedy. In Crawford, the Court made clear that the

189. Id. at 462.
190. See id. at 471.
191. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1500-01.
Despite its facially neutral language, the Court found that Initiative 350 in reality barred
only busing plans aimed at achieving racial integration while permitting busing for other
purposes. In striking down the initiative, the Court found that it, like the enactment
in Hunter singled out an issue of concern to minorities-racial busing-and imposed
special political burdens on those who supported the issue. These features of Initiative
350 led the Court to find that the facially-neutral measure was, in reality, a racial
classification, subject to the most searching judicial scrutiny. In the words of the Court,
It is beyond dispute... that the initiative was enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects upon busing for integration. As in Hunter, the Court concluded
that, viewed in this light, Initiative 350 violated the 14th Amendment.

Id.
192.
193.

See id. at 1502.
See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 527.
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simple repeal of an antidiscrimination law raises no Equal Protection
Like the measure in Crawford, Proposition 209 is an
concern.'
antidiscrimination law requiring other state governmental agencies not
to practice race and sex discrimination, except where required by
relevant federal law.
Proposition 209 does not have a race or gender focus. It was
enacted in spite of its potentially disproportionate adverse impact on
racial minorities and women. The racial focus inquiry does not depend
on the wisdom or efficacy of a specific affirmative action program.19
When there are no constitutional violations, race- and gender-based
affirmative action policies "are matters to be resolved through the
political process.' 1 96 "This Court has no trouble concluding that
affirmative action is appropriately understood as a 'racial problem' and,
Contrary to the court's
"..."197
similarly, a 'gender problem' .
broadly, affirmative
and,
more
209
Proposition
decision in Wilson,
action, are best understood as problems of economic disparity. The
decisions in Hunter and Seattle can best be explained by the Supreme
Court's apparent conclusion that the measures could only rationally be
explained as the products of impermissible motivation or other illicit
state action. 198
Proposition 209 does not restructure the political process so as to
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it may now become
more burdensome for supporters of affirmative action based on race or
gender to petition their state government for redress under a measure
lacking an impermissible motivation or other illicit state action. The
fact that supporters of race- and gender-based governmental affirmative
action policies must amend the state constitution to receive a preference
is not a constitutionally impermissible political hurdle. This type of
obstacle is not unconstitutional because it was created despite its
impact on affirmative action, rather than because of its adverse effects
on interests important to women and minorities. Unlike minorities and

194. See id.
195. See Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1505.
196. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 474.
197. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1505.
198. See id. at 1506.
In so finding, the Court does not pass on whether any discriminatory intent lay behind
the adoption of Proposition 209. The Supreme Court in Seattle made it plain that such
an inquiry is not required under the Seattle-Hunter analysis. [citations omitted] The
Court nevertheless notes that the Supreme Court in Seattle also suggested that any
measure that ran afoul of the Seattle-Hunter analysis 'inevitably raises dangers of
impermissible motivation....

Id. at 1506 n.27.
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women, "those seeking preferential treatment on all other grounds need
not surmount any new political hurdles." '9 9 When minorities and
women must jump new political hurdles as an incident of state

citizenship, the Constitution is simply not violated.

The Wilson

defendants correctly argued that Proposition 209 in no way reorders
the political process for racial and gender preferences because the
prohibition on such preferences is viewed as a general attack on race

and sex discrimination.200

The court in Wilson likely committed

reversible error by concluding that the issue in Proposition 209 is
about preferences rather than about discrimination. The realistic

message of Proposition 209 is that all race- and sex-based discrimination is presumed to be invidious and therefore a violation of a person's

individual constitutional right to equal protection in California. °1
Political correctness aside, gender- and race-based preferences are
considered discrimination and thus entitled to a presumption that such
preferences are unconstitutional. In Crawford, local school boards that
had been free to adopt certain busing programs to promote racial
integration, remained free after the passage of Proposition I to adopt
such programs. 0 2 The Wilson court believed that Proposition I in
Crawford survived constitutional attack because of the ability to adopt
school busing in the future to achieve desegregation. Proposition 209,
like the measure in Crawford, allows local governments to support
racial and gender diversity in education, employment and contracting
by implementing economic or class-based affirmative action. Because
women and racial minorities tend to be disproportionately economically
disadvantaged owing to societal discrimination, they will benefit more
199. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1506.
200. See id. at 1507.
201. See id.
In response to plaintiffs showing regarding political burden, defendants insist that
Proposition 209 in no way reorders the political process with respect to race and gender

preferences.

In their view, the proper forum for addressing fundamental issues

regarding individual rights has always been the state constitution, and Proposition 209
merely modifies the existing constitutional guarantee of equal treatment at the
governmental level. This argument has substantial merit with respect to Proposition
209's broad antidiscrimination provision the general ban on invidious race and gender
discrimination is certainly a matter of constitutional decisionmaking. As the Court has
pointed out, however, it is Proposition 209's ban on preferences, not its general ban on

discrimination, that is the focus of the instant lawsuit. In this narrower context,
defendants' argument falls short. Prior to the passage of Proposition 209, the discretion
to adopt constitutionally-permissibly race-and-gender-conscious affirmative action
programs, was as defendants counsel conceded at oral argument, lodged with state and
local government entities, not reserved at the constitutional level.
Id. at 1507.
202. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535-36.
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than others from affirmative actions policies designed to promote
economic diversity.
Wilson is not significantly different from Crawford. First,
Proposition 209 can be fairly characterized as a mere repeal of existing
state and local affirmative action programs based on gender or race.
However, the government remains free to adopt all other diversity
affirmative action goals. Issues of economic disparity that impact racial
minorities and women can still be addressed at the local level through
economic based affirmative action as a reasonable and preferred
alternative to race- or gender-based affirmative action. The court in
Wilson improperly applied heightened scrutiny to Proposition 209, a
measure that was gender- and race-neutral and void of illicit state
action. It is only when governmental action is based on illicit gender
or race classification that the court must use "a most searching
examination. "2" The mere reordering of the political process to
prohibit affirmative action on the basis of race or gender should not
invoke heightened judicial review. A state remains free to restructure
the political process, in the absence of an illicit state action through a
neutral method, even where such change incidentally burdens the
political participation of women and minorities. 2 °
VI.

CONCLUSION

Proposition 209 will likely be held constitutional because those
supporting race- and gender-based governmental affirmative action
policies were given an opportunity in California to compete within the
fair rules of the political process. Yet, those supporters lost in the
democratic struggle to establish nontraditional battle lines against racial
and gender discrimination.0 3
The legal battle over whether Proposition 209 is valid under the
Constitution has not yet been resolved. However, a three-judge panel
of the Ninth Circuit has overturned the preliminary injunction issued
20 6
by the Wilson court.
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